This paper investigates the role of moral hazard from government intervention on the risk-taking behavior of U.S. financial institutions in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis. Using crosssectional variation in political connections to measure the effect of moral hazard, I find a higher exposure to Level-3 (toxic) assets and lower 2008 stock returns at financial firms with politically-connected directors and prior lobbying connections. Having a politically-connected director on a 10-member board corresponds to an additional twenty percentage points in the proportion of market value in toxic assets and a drop of six percentage points in 2008 stock returns. In order to address endogeneity concerns, I also look at an exogenous source of variation in political connections: whether the firm is based in a state represented on the Senate Banking Committee. Here, I find that representation on the committee increases firm risk, even after controlling for firm characteristics through firm fixed effects. The results focus new attention on government-generated incentives for risk-taking in the financial sector.
then returned to serve on boards of Wall Street firms. In addition to industry-wide political power, we also see individual companies working to build their own connections in Washington.
The "Friends of Angelo" program by Countrywide Financial which provided high-ranking government officials with special mortgage deals is perhaps the most notorious example from recent years. I examine the risk-taking behavior of nearly one thousand publicly-traded financial institutions prior to the 2008 financial crisis. I find that firms with stronger political connections had larger shares of their firm value invested in risky Level-3 assets 5 which later became popularly known as "toxic assets". A typical firm with one (out of ten) politically-connected board members had (on average) an extra 20 percentage points of its equity in toxic assets relative to a typical firm with no politically-connected directors. Similarly, a two-standard deviation increase in lobbying corresponded to approximately a 22 percentage-point increase in the toxic assets-to-equity ratio. The magnitudes of these results suggest that the increased exposure to Level-3 assets by politically-connected institutions had significant adverse implications for their shareholders when the assets became toxic and sank in value during the 2008 financial crisis.
While these findings are broadly consistent with the theory that a higher probability of future bailouts increases risk-taking behavior, there are a number of alternative explanations.
One possible mechanism is reverse causality: financial institutions that were subject to higher risk (for other exogenous reasons) were building political connections as a type of insurance against that risk. In order to assess this alternative explanation, I run an instrumental variable regression using lagged values of political connections (from prior to the start of the housing bubble) as instruments. This does not significantly affect the magnitudes of the coefficients on political connections. Another worry is that political connections are correlated with other variables that directly affect risk-taking. I control for company size, industry (e.g. bank vs.
insurance company), CEO characteristics such as gender, age, and experience, and insider ownership, and find that the main results are robust to these controls.
Still, these regressions use board-connections and lobbying which are clearly choice variables of firms. The best way to handle endogeneity concerns is by testing the effect on risktaking using a source of exogenous variation in political connections over which firms can exercise little or no control. Taking inspiration from the OneUnited Bank episode described above, I use the power of a financial institution's home Senators as my source of exogenous variation in political connections. Another useful advantage of this exercise is that since the data 5 According to the FASB, Level-3 assets are "assets whose values are based on prices or valuation techniques that require inputs that are both unobservable and significant to the overall fair value measurement." susceptible to reverse causality effects, and extend the results to a 35-year time frame going back to 1973 using powerful political representation as an exogenous measure of risk-taking. Earlier research on political connections has either focused on the value of benefits to business (through political favors, etc.) or the harm to social welfare arising from government interference in the free market. My paper instead focuses attention on direct negative consequences to those businesses that establish political connections. In addition, I establish a connection between exogenous variation in political connections (through powerful representatives in Washington) and firm behavior. This builds on earlier research which has primarily looked at the effect of political connections which can be influenced by the firm.
This paper also has important implications for the current policy debate in Washington over the future of the US financial system. As long as financial institutions perceive that they will be bailed out by the government in adverse circumstances, they have perverse incentives to take risks that will increase the probability of such circumstances. However, my second set of results suggests that limits on political connections (e.g. campaign finance laws or lobbying restrictions) will also not solve the moral hazard problem since members of Congress will always have powerful incentives to serve their constituents (for other examples, see Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2009) ) Another proposed solution is increased government regulation of the financial sector (various regulatory proposals are currently being debated in Congress). However, such regulations may be thwarted as financial innovation evolves to outwit regulators, and may instead lead to adverse consequences such as a brain drain from the US financial sector (see Leonard Kostovetsky, 2009) . Only resetting the bailout expectations of corporate managers is likely to remove the incentives that create the next financial crisis.
I. Data and Methodology
Several different sources of data were merged for this study. Boardex data on corporate For each firm and quarter, I multiply the quarterly spending by four (to get an annualized figure) and then take the time-series average of annualized lobbying over the sixteen quarters from The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) responded by issuing FAS157 which set up a three-tiered hierarchy for balance sheet assets: Level-1 assets with observable market prices, Level-2 assets with comparable market-traded assets, and Level-3 assets which have no observable market data and must be valued using financial models. In the first quarter of 2008 11 ,
COMPUSTAT provided data on different asset levels for nearly 2 out of 3 financial institutions.
Through 2008, investors looked to Level-3 assets as measures of firm exposure to the credit crisis, and the assets became known as "toxic" assets.
In this paper, I use the holdings in toxic assets (as of the first quarter of 2008) as one measure of risk-taking and scale it by firm's market value from the beginning of the quarter. This ratio can easily be interpreted as the decline in a firm's value if the toxic assets lost all value. All the results in this paper are also robust to using toxic assets data from later quarters since there was very little trading of toxic assets throughout the 2008 financial crisis.
Of course there are many other forms of risk-taking besides the holdings of risky illiquid securities. Looking at leverage and capital ratios is often a useful method for measuring firm risk, but unfortunately there is almost no variation in these ratios for the highly-regulated financial industry. This suggests that a lot of the risk-taking was done through off-balance sheet Daily stock returns are obtained from CRSP and daily stock volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns across a particular calendar year. Additionally, I use market beta which is defined as the coefficient from regressing stock returns (minus the risk-free rate) on market (all stocks in CRSP) returns minus the risk-free rate over a particular calendar year.
E. Control Variables
In multivariable regression analysis, I control for a number of other variables that might also explain risk-taking by financial institutions. The most important of these control variables is company size. Large companies are more likely to be bailed-out under the "too big to fail" doctrine that aims to prevent contagion by rescuing firms whose failure might endanger the entire financial system. Large companies are also more likely to have the resources to hire politically-connected directors and/or to spend money on lobbying activities. I use shares outstanding and market prices which are available in CRSP to calculate market capitalization as my main proxy for company size.
Another set of controls are based on manager characteristics and stakes in the company.
They are included as controls because they may affect the manager's incentives to take risk. I use CEO biographical data from Boardex to find CEO age, gender, and experience ( Table 6 , I compare the loadings of portfolios on various factors including the market (MKTMRF), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors for politically-connected vs. unconnected financial firms. The returns on these factor portfolios are downloaded from Ken French's website 12 .
<<Insert Table 1 Here>> There is also significant variation in political connections although the distributions are skewed by the large number of firms with zero politically-connected directors and no lobbying activity. The typical firm has 1.7% of its board consist of politically-connected directors although over 80% of firms have no politically-connected directors. The typical firm also spends about $21,000 on lobbying per year, although over 75% spend no money on lobbying. The summary data on control variables shows that 3% of CEOs in the sample are women, the average age is 55.4 years and the typical CEO has worked for 7.0 years in that position. Finally, insiders own 11% of the typical firm in this sample.
II. Results <<Insert Figure 1 Here>>
I start by investigating the effect of politically-connected boards and firm lobbying on risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. Table 2 . T-statistics throughout this table are calculated using heteroskedaticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980) . Specifications (1) and (2) use the ratio of toxic assets-to-market capitalization (as of the first quarter of 2008) as the dependent variable. In the univariate regression in specification (1), I find a coefficient on
Pol.Dir share of 1.96 (statistically significant at the 1% level). This means that one politicallyconnected director (on a board with 10 members) corresponds to an increase of 20 percentage points in the ratio of toxic assets-to-equity. Adding control variables for firm size, CEO characteristics and insider holdings, and industry/metroarea dummy variables in specification (2) only slightly decreases the coefficient to 1.82 (statistically significant at the 5% level). Overall, we can see that firms with politically-connected directors during the period of the housing bubble were also more likely to hold their portfolios in risky and illiquid toxic assets.
Still, the variation in exposure to toxic assets was only one component of the variation in total risk-taking by financial institutions over the last decade. Many financial firms also relaxed their lending standards and expanded into riskier businesses such as the sub-prime mortgage market (see Igan, Mishra, and Tressel, 2009) . While it's difficult to measure these types of risk directly, it is logical to assume that firms that took on more (overall) risk were also more exposed to the financial crisis that followed. Thus, I use firm ex-post stock performance (after the risktaking period) as an alternative way of measuring risk-taking behavior. It is true that returns are also likely to include other information such as, for example, the effectiveness of the firm's response to the financial crisis. Still, the steepness of the 2008 downturn suggests that most of the variation in stock returns came from differences in risk exposure to the housing bubble and financial instruments whose value was tied to housing prices.
For specifications (3) and (4) of Table 2 I also find that none of the other controls have a statistically significant effect on stock returns except for stock size (which has a t-statistic of 1.96). This result is intriguing since moral hazard theory would suggest that larger firms are more likely to take risk (since they are more likely to be considered "too-big-to-fail") and yet they had higher 2008 stock returns. One possible way to understand this result is that the actual government bailouts raised the value of large firms more than small firms since they were centered on the premise of too-big-to-fail. It's also generally the case that large firms are less exposed to market downturns due to their sheer size and ability to diversify across different businesses, regions, or countries.
B. Effect of Lobbying Spending on Firm Risk-Taking <<Insert Table 3 Here>>
In order to test the robustness of the effect of political connection on firm risk-taking, I
repeat the tests with an additional measure of political connections, firm lobbying activity. The reason why using lobbying activity to measure political connections makes sense is that firms that engage in lobbying are generally able to build long-term relationships with their targets. So even though the main purpose of a lobbying campaign is to influence a current decision such as a Congressman's vote on a critical piece of legislation, it provides firms with connections that they can use in the future when they need favors. I run cross-sectional regressions of the same measures of risk-taking (from Table 2 ) on Log LobbyFees (the natural logarithm of the average annual spending on lobbying) and a number of control variables and report the estimated coefficients in Table 3 . T-statistics throughout this table are calculated using heteroskedaticityrobust standard errors.
Specifications (1) and (2) politically-connected directors, they are measuring political connections of different types so it is heartening that they both affect risk-taking behavior and that the economic magnitudes of the effects are similar.
As in Table 2 
C. Endogeneity and Other Potential Pitfalls
Endogeneity poses the biggest concern for the tests we have run so far. Although the dependent variables data on toxic assets and stock returns comes from 2008, the seeds of risktaking were sowed earlier and were only reaped during the 2008 collapse. Therefore, firm risktaking behavior was chosen at the same time as lobbying and employment of politicallyconnected directors. This makes it hard to determine the direction of causality: Did firms first choose their risk-taking and then decide on political connections or the other way around as I theorize in this paper? One way to resolve this issue is to go even earlier in time and use data on political connections from before the housing bubble even began.
<<Insert Table 4 Table 4 shows the results from these instrumental variables regressions. In specifications (1) and (2) Table 2 ). In specifications (3) and (4) of Table 4 , the explanatory variable of interest is the natural logarithm of annual lobbying spending, Log LobbyFees. Once again, using lagged values of lobbying as instruments does not significantly affect the coefficient on this variable (compared with Table 3 ). Overall, the results in Table 4 show that political connections established prior to the start of the housing bubble are correlated with risk-taking behavior, suggesting that the main effect is not coming because firms boosted political connections to protect themselves from exposure to the housing bubble.
Still, it is self-evident that firms have control over their directors and their lobbying activities so there might be other factors that are correlated with these explanatory variables and that also affect risk-taking. I have tried to mitigate this problem by controlling for firm-level variables such as size and industry, manager-level variables such as age, experience, and insider ownership, and the metro-area where the firm is based (since different parts of the country were impacted in different ways by the housing bubble). Yet it would be best to examine whether political connections not controlled by the firm also have an effect on risk-taking. Another question is how far we can generalize the results of this paper if it only focuses on risk-taking behavior during one very unusual event, the housing bubble and the financial crisis that followed. In the remainder of this paper, I attempt to generalize the results by examining a longer sample period view time and by using a measure of political connections which is not part of a firm's choice function. 
D. Effect of Home State's Senators on Firm Risk Taking

<<Insert Figure 1 Here>>
Another concern is that new Senators base their choice of committee assignments on the type of financial firms in their home states. This may create a correlation between Committee
Senators and risk-taking behavior not arising from moral hazard. Fortunately, the financial industry is pretty evenly spread-out over the country (except for New York which is the center of the financial industry) so this committee is different from Agriculture where the committee members are all from farm states. A quick look at the current membership of the committee (see The next question is how to measure firm risk-taking over the past few decades. We don't have a long time-series sample on toxic assets since they came into existence in 2008 so we want something analogous to the 2008 calendar-year returns variable. The analogue I use in this paper is the standard deviation of stock returns, which has long been used as a measure of total firm risk in finance (see Harry M. Markowitz, 1952 One alternative explanation for this finding is that the higher volatility of politicallyconnected stocks reflects the fact that the firm's value becomes more sensitive to changes in the power of its ally Senator in Washington. For example, if the Senator is involved in a scandal or has a health episode, the stock price might go down and if the Senator gains influence (because a higher Senator retires, for example), the stock price might go up. While these types of events increase total risk (measured by stock volatility), they should not affect the systematic risk of the firm. In order to test this hypothesis, I investigate the effect of Committee Senator on stock's beta with respect to the market in Panel B.
In specification (1), I find that firms based in a state with a Senator on the Banking
Committee have a market beta that is about 0.09 higher than non-connected firms (statistically significant at the 1% level). In other words, these connected firms are about 9% more sensitive to movements in the broader market than a typical firm. In specification (2), I add firm size as a control and find a lower coefficient of 0.04 which is still significant. When I add firm fixed effects in specifications (3) and (4), I find that when a firm gains a home Senator on the Banking Committee, its market beta also goes up. The results are economically smaller although still statistically significant with fund and industry controls in specification (4). In sum, the findings in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that systematic risk and not just idiosyncratic risk goes up for politically-connected firms.
<<Insert Table 6 Here>>
One problem with estimating stock-specific betas is that the results are highly noisy so the usual practice is to sort stocks into portfolios and regress portfolio returns on returns generated by various factors (see Fama and French, 1992) to find the factor loadings (or betas). I perform this analysis in Table 6 and investigate whether portfolios of stocks with Committee Senator equal to one have higher betas with respect to the market than portfolios of stocks with non-connected home Senators. In Panel A of Table 6 , I annually sort firms into ten portfolios based on firm size quintile and Committee Senator. I then regress monthly portfolio returns (minus the risk-free rate) on the market return minus the risk-free rate (MKTMRF), a Committee Senator dummy (equal to one for portfolios with Committee home Senators, zero otherwise), and an interaction term. The market beta for portfolios of unconnected stocks is 0.901 while the interaction term (which shows the difference in beta between connected and unconnected portfolios) is 0.148 (t-stat of 3.53). Running this regression for each size quintile individually
shows that politically-connected portfolios within each size quintile are more sensitive to the market than unconnected portfolios. The differences in market betas range from 0.038 for the smallest stocks to 0.133 for the third quintile. The coefficients on Committee Senator are negative (but statistically insignificant) so risk-adjusted returns are lower for portfolios of connected stocks. This suggests that the stock market may be overvaluing political connections leading to lower future excess returns for these firms.
In Panel B of Table 6 , I expand this analysis to a four-factor model to ensure that the differences in market betas in Panel A are not actually coming from differences in other pricing variables such as the size, value, or momentum effects. I regress monthly portfolio returns on the monthly returns from the market-minus-risk-free portfolio (MKTMRF), small-minus-big portfolio (SMB), high book-to-market minus low book-to-market portfolio (HML), and winnersminus-losers portfolio (MOM). Again, I add the Committee Senator dummy variable and interaction terms to pick up differences in loadings between portfolios of connected and unconnected stocks. I find a positive coefficient of 0.138 (statistically significant at the 1% level)
on the interaction between Committee Senator and MKTMRF which means that portfolios of connected stocks have a higher market beta (as in Panel A). However, the coefficients on the other interaction terms are insignificant. So the main difference between portfolios of politicallyconnected and unconnected stocks is a higher sensitivity to movements in the broader market. This is consistent with greater risk-taking activity by managers at politically-connected firms. 
III. Discussion
The critical component of the economic mechanism of moral hazard is the rational belief or expectation by market participants of outside intervention in adverse states of the world. In our example of financial risk-taking by politically-connected firms, the economic intuition only makes sense if management at financial institutions had good reason to believe that the government would get involved and that political connections would be helpful in those situations. Therefore, it's instructive to closely examine the history of US government involvement and intervention in financial markets.
The government's role in financial markets is most evident in the market for mortgages.
Since the 1930s when the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was established, the US government has promoted home ownership by an implicit guarantee (which lowers the cost of capital) of government-sponsored enterprises that purchase and securitize mortgages.
With the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act, in the late 1970s, the government also started overseeing lending to ensure that low-income and urban communities would have access to credit. By the 1990s, increasing government pressure led to a growing subprime market for those borrowers whose income or credit rating couldn't qualify them for conventional loans. 
IV. Conclusion
Moral hazard has been a staple of economic theory since the 1960s but economists know little about how firm incentives are affected by potential government intervention. In this paper, I
examine whether moral hazard played a role in the 2008 financial crisis and whether it generally affects risk-taking behavior by financial institutions. I use variation in political connections (including politically-connected board members, lobbying activity, and the power of home Senators) to investigate the connection between risk-taking and probability of beneficial government action such as cash infusions or direct bailouts. I find that politically-connected firms had significantly higher ratio of toxic assets-to-equity on their balance sheets and had lower stock returns during the collapse of the housing bubble. The sample for this study is all financial companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) with share codes of 10 and 11 in the CRSP database. Table 1 ). Specifications 2 and 4 also include MetroArea dummies for the metropolitan area where the financial institutions are headquartered. T-statistics using HuberWhite heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level, and * indicates coefficient significant at the 10% level. Table 1) . Specifications 2 and 4 also include Metro Area dummies for the metropolitan area where the financial institutions are headquartered. T-statistics using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level, and * indicates coefficient significant at the 10% level. Table 1 ) and Metro Area dummies for the metropolitan area where the financial institutions are headquartered. T-statistics using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level, and * indicates coefficient significant at the 10% level. Volatility for a firm-year observation is defined as the standard deviation of firm's stock returns for that calendar year. In Panel B, the dependent variable Market Beta for a firm-year observation is defined as the beta (with respect to the the market portfolio) of firm's stock returns for that calendar year. Specifications (2) and (4) also include a one-year lag of the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization and industry dummies (for the industries shown in Panel B of Table 1 ). Specifications (3) and (4) also include firm fixed effects. All specifications include year dummies. T-statistics using standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level, and * indicates coefficient significant at the 10% level. Fama and French (1992) and the momentum factor of Carhart (1997), and interaction terms. Each year, stocks are sorted into five size quintiles based on end-of-year market capitalization (using NYSE breakpoints) and allocated into ten portfolios based on size quintile and whether Committee Senator is zero or one. A monthly portfolio return is the value-weighted (using market capitalization) average of returns of stocks in that portfolio. Panel A regresses monthly portfolio returns on MKTMRF (return of market minus the risk-free rate), Committee Senator, and an interaction term. Panel B regresses monthly portfolio returns on MKTMRF, SMB (return of small stocks minus large stocks), HML (return of high book-tomarket stocks minus low book-to-market stocks), and MOM (return of prior winners minus prior losers), Committee Senator, and interaction terms. Monthly returns of the MKTMRF, SMB, HML, and MOM portfolios can be obtained from Ken French's website whose URL is: "http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/". *** indicates coefficients statistically significant at the 1% level, ** indicates coefficient significant at the 5% level, and * indicates coefficient significant at the 10% level. 
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